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Abstract: The global economy has experienced considerable turbulence since 2007. 
The financial crisis has been viewed as the trigger for a prolonged period of eco-
nomic decline. This decline remains an issue for all member states of the European 
Union, the eurozone and beyond. We argue genesis of this crisis lies in the integra-
tion negotiations of 1991, ratified in 1992. These produced a flawed economic mod-
el within the eurozone. Given the seeds of decay were planted at origin; we argue 
the solution can be found through a reconstructed eurozone via looser integration, 
where countries less equipped to deal with the realities of closer integration will be 
economically independent.
Subjects: Economic Theory & Philosophy; International Economics; Macroeconomics
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1. Introduction 
Panics do not destroy capital; they merely reveal the extent to which it has been destroyed 
by its betrayal into hopelessly unproductive works. (John Stuart Mill)
The eurozone is the aggregate of the world’s second largest economy, similar in size to the United 
States (US) in terms of financial scope. Its currency, the euro, is the world’s second most important 
reserve asset. It accounts for a quarter of the world’s currency reserve, indicating its high significance 
as a global currency. Its economic impact cannot be underestimated. The affect of the eurozone 
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banking system within the Union is significantly larger than those felt within the United States, with 
certain states having balance sheets which “… are very large relative to the size of their country’s 
economy” (Artus, 2010, p. 3). Then threats of the Euros collapse therefore represent a catastrophic 
financial and economic problem of unparalleled global significance, impacting upon economic confi-
dence and fiscal stabilities well beyond the narrow confines of its predetermined arena.
The creation of the European Union (EU) which includes the onset of currency union—was a sig-
nificant part of a series of economic and political integration projects in post-war Europe:
Between 1945 and 1950, a handful of courageous statesmen including Robert Schuman, 
Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi and Winston Churchill set about persuading their 
peoples to enter a new era. New structures would be created in Western Europe, based 
on shared interests and founded upon treaties guaranteeing the rule of law and equality 
between all countries. (Gil, 2006)
It was established as a political response to the catastrophic events of the first half of the twentieth 
century vis-a-vis the social impacts of the depression and the two world wars. Economically, it was 
also a response to the threats of Soviet expansionism in Europe, retarded in part through such US 
fiscal interventions as the Marshall Plan. Established as a means of ensuring peace, it has now shift-
ed character over the course of the latter part of the twentieth century towards ensuring the power 
of individual nations to compete in a globalised market comprised of larger trading blocs. This is 
confirmed by Tony Blair, who argues that “the 21st Century case for Europe is about power versus 
irrelevance” (Blair, 2012). The EU can be viewed as a political and economic project, designed to 
compete in the ever-increasing globalised world.
However, today the EU is challenged by the integration of states that are, arguably, unprepared 
for succession either economically or politically into the trading bloc. The EU was and is designed for 
mature economic liberal democracies with a welfare ethos. This was challenged by the inclusion of 
less developed eastern European economies, some of which are still recovering from the legacies of 
communism. This notwithstanding the “European Project” the European project has been perceived 
by some as a cataclysmic error which has presented tremendous economic problems. This is due to 
the economic disparities which lie between the states. In trying to bind these states together all that 
has been created is political and economic frictions. The challenge of creating prosperous integra-
tion has been problematic.
In this paper, we will develop this proposition, arguing the European project is too large in its cur-
rent form to continue, and that without massive reconstruction of the relationship between euro-
zone states and the broader EU membership, it is unlikely to emerge as a strong economic bloc, 
arguably negating its raison d’être. To do this, we will first discuss the background and symptoms of 
the crisis, drawing from post-crisis events in our analysis. This is necessary to contextualise any pro-
posed solutions, which we advance in the latter part of the paper to determine whether and how the 
eurozone can and will survive the crisis.
2. Methodology
The methodology applied within this paper was built upon critical review of the secondary literature. 
The systematic review provided an exhaustive summary of literature relevant to the financial crisis 
in Europe.
The first step of the review was a thorough search of the literature for relevant publications. 
Publications were assigned an objective assessment of methodological quality using a rating sys-
tem. The researchers kept a log of the search strings used and the results. The search string yielded 
more than 100 references. Additional terms (keywords) were added to the string to focus the search 
more accurately. Next, the titles and the abstracts of the identified articles were checked against 
pre-determined criteria for eligibility and relevance. To ensure that the searches undertaken were 
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consistent and comparable, the method applied involved keywords and phrases derived from the 
research topic. These were then placed into categories and assigned keyword numbers to allow their 
strategic combination according to researcher impressions from a preliminary literature trawl: key-
word 1 words were to be paired with every keyword 2 word once. These were “euro” and “eurozone”, 
respectively.
The initial search returned a high number of references (70 or more), the second search was fur-
ther refined by adding keyword 3 (“outcomes”) to the search string. Search logs were compared 
between researchers to ensure that the terms had been applied consistently (Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2007). This research was refined to 35 articles which directly addressed the topic under 
consideration.
3. Analysis of the crisis
Causal factors of the crisis are international credit, public finances, current account surpluses, their 
interdependent relationship and net exports as capital. The alignment of each of these issues stripped 
away the credibility of the eurozone and its capacity to recover. For the countries now in difficulty, 
their inability to apply fiscal policies as a remedy to localised recessions causes significant internal 
and external strain.
However, on an even more fundamental level, the crisis is one of balance of payments and financ-
ing. Wolf (2012a) notes when countries start lending across the frontiers to other countries the 
economies adapt in complex ways. When financing ceases, it creates “a sudden stop”. It is this 
which helped lead to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, acting as a trigger at the start of the eco-
nomic crisis. Its impact was exacerbated by internal capital flows from creditor nations in northern 
Europe to the deficit nations in the south. These current accounting imbalances between income 
and trade deficits occurred due to the flow of capital generated by a superficial but sustained boom 
in the decade previous to the crisis. During this time, private sector lenders advanced funds to high 
risk entities, principally governments and/or banks. The implosion of the financial sector produced a 
major downturn in countries’ revenue base, collapsing the broader economy and producing the eco-
nomic crisis. This resulted in governments becoming insolvent and needing to be bailed out by the 
central institutions of global governance, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Moreover, 
as these countries did not have effective independent central banks to govern their own economies, 
they did not have the ability to adjust domestic exchange rates to deal with the localised economic 
conditions in their sovereign territory. This implosion should be seen as a symptom of the economic 
integration crisis, rather than a cause.
The financial crisis shone light upon lenders who disregarded the accepted principles of sound 
lending. In the boom years before 2007, lenders advanced funds to those who, had normal under-
writing procedures been applied, would have no realistic chance of repaying the loan on the terms 
agreed. This point is supported by the public debt positions, and is a simple measure of fiscal stress 
relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The consequences of such major divergences of competi-
tiveness are demonstrated by their scope, such as the economic collapse of Ireland, Spain, Portugal, 
Italy and Greece, each of which generated major divergences in competitiveness within the single 
currency area. There was no exchange rate adjustment available to national economies, thus such 
countries became very uncompetitive whilst simultaneously running up bad debts.
Moreover, the aggregate balance of payments for the eurozone has been imbalanced throughout 
its history. With the onset of the eurozone project, more prosperous states such as Germany have 
become an increasingly dominant player in the broader EU. Combined with the Netherlands, both 
can justly be reasonably described as “surplus countries”, who have led the bailouts to countries 
such as Greece. As a result of this domination defined by comparative wealth, the poorer nations 
have become less significant in terms of been able to determine their own economic future, with 
dominant actors emerging as the greater capital exporters, garnering a much higher share of the 
eurozone GDP. Given the fiscal importance of balancing national budgets, the imbalance in the 
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eurozone as a single unit was placed under increasing pressure from the dearth nations. Capital 
flows were exported from the wealthier nations towards the poorer, making economic instability 
even greater.
To exacerbate this crisis, poorer countries were running current account deficits. Over an 11-year 
period, Portugal ran a deficit of 9% of GDP, Greece 8% and Spain 6%. These countries, at the end of 
2007, had a net asset position representing in excess of minus 100% of GDP. Inevitably, this pro-
duced a loss of confidence and a flight of capital from those countries. This created a situation where 
the markets stopped functioning and the affected countries did not have the capacity to raise any 
new income through conventional taxation. An important part of this narrative is when capital was 
flowing more freely, these countries were spending beyond their income. There was a pronounced 
neglect of traditional industry and competitiveness because foreign capital was providing them with 
a significant part of their imports, financed by artificial capital. As such their export sectors were 
squeezed and real wages rose. During the “boom” years, the export sector was tightened through 
real wage increases rising faster than productivity, the result of which was growing labour costs, 
reducing competitiveness.
Moreover, in the years prior to the debt crisis, western governments failed to adequately regulate 
their banks because they bought into the opportune view that the “… problem of depression preven-
tion had been solved” (Lucas, 2003). Added to this were the non-conventional underwriting methods 
in lending which led to large volumes of capital being advanced to sub-prime individuals, groups and 
governments. This was particularly evident in the US sub-prime mortgage market. This lack of fiscal 
prudence and regulation enabled their drive for profit to dominate policy formulation, leading to lax 
investments in unproductive works. Efforts were promoted with monetary imprudence, regulatory 
forbearance and government tax incentives that marginalised investment. This enabled markets to 
become fragmented through off-exchange trading and derivatives that no longer performed the 
economically critical function of capital allocation and price transparently. The results of which were 
serial bubbles such as debt financed speculation in real estate, investments and commodities. Since 
August 2007, there has been a steady constriction of credit markets, starting with the aforemen-
tioned subprime mortgage bank securities, spreading to interbank credit, bond markets and securi-
ties more generally. Prior to the crisis, a period of high regulatory imprudence dominated.
This is the critical argument. Viewed from this perspective, the Western world may face decades 
of under-production, over-consumption, under-investment and over-spending, each tending to a 
greater imbalance in debt. This may, if combined with oscillations induced by disturbances, take the 
eurozone economies beyond the point where they could right themselves into a deflationary spiral. 
The support from the European central bank as a lender of last resort has been somewhat important 
in offsetting the worse symptoms of the recession. However, this is not as effective as having bank 
that can target the regional decline. As an evaluation, when Spain is contrasted with the United 
Kingdom (UK), both have similar fiscal situations; however, they diverge in that both have different 
interest rates on public debt. Such interest rates contribute towards the credit rating of a state’s 
economy. Spain remains more vulnerable to currency liquidity and default risk, to which the UK is not 
as exposed. Yet Spain’s net public debt is lower than in the UK; however, Spain has a much less ma-
ture financial sector. The UK is currently trading on a 10 year debt with 10 years government bonds. 
These bonds are trading at 1.6%, which is the lowest yield on UK government bonds in the history of 
its 300 year bond trading. Spain on the other hand is trading at between 6 and 7%, which is unsus-
tainable in the long term. Its 10 year bond yield listed at 2.1% UK is at 2.3% currently. Ireland sup-
posedly one of the PIGS has a 10 year yield of 1.63%. UK growth rates are much lower than Ireland 
Spain’s debt interest rates are higher because the British treasury is not expected to default. In part, 
the fiscal rebalancing generates more confidence in the markets, and the City of London ensures the 
British economy remains locked out of the fiscal catastrophe of other eurozone nations. In part, this 
is also due to the greater credibility and stability of the broader British economy, but the icing on the 
cake is the all-important central bank. Britain has more control over its finances through its central 
bank, and it is outside of the eurozone. It can be concluded that given no two economies in the EU 
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are alike, solutions for one will be different to another, and that high income countries embedded 
inside a currency union are more vulnerable to balance of payments in a financial crisis than coun-
tries with floating exchange rates and their own central banks. The crisis has demonstrated that ever 
closer union is inadequate; however, given those in the eurozone have chosen to participate in such 
an undertaking, it is now a reality from which Britain and the rest of the EU simply cannot hide. “Ever 
closer Union” in the original 1956 Treaty of Six is only a vague aspiration. Without political union, 
monetary union will be a crisis-prone shambles every time there is an economic shock?
Moreover, the public deficit faced by Greece at the start of the economic crisis was approximately 
100%. During the course of the crisis, this increased dramatically to over 160%. GDP will be falling in 
the current paralysis as debt grows. The deficit faced by Italy has also dramatically increased to 
approximately 100%. Although this is not as substantial as Greece, it is certainly a substantial in-
crease. Also, we must consider what has happened in Spain and Ireland to better understand pos-
sible solutions. As the financial crisis struck, these countries had strong fiscal positions and low net 
public debt. Ireland’s deficit was approximately 11%, yet this has risen to over 100% in the four 
years since the start of the crisis. This can justly be described, therefore as the largest fiscal catas-
trophe following a financial crisis witnessed in recent history. The main causal factors for these in-
creases are the bailing out the banks, coupled with more conventional consequences of a recession 
vis-à-vis unemployment and declining living standards. Sudden and immense rises in credit spreads, 
and the differences between interest rates on these governments, created disparity in the impacts 
felt by the countries concerned. When countries are facing such dramatically increased spreads, 
they are typically paying interest rates of 5, 6, or 7% per annum. This compounds the debt position 
for those countries, contracting their economy. The real level of debt explodes because of the cost of 
rolling over the debt year to year. Moreover, the collapse of the integration of the eurozone financial 
market and the increased reliance of these governments on domestic credit means that if a country 
goes bankrupt, they wipe out their economies, taking their banking system with them, and needing 
further external intervention. Lack of confidence also leads to foreign investors abandoning the 
economy. Foreign ownership has declined in some eurozone countries from 15 to 80%, which is 
projected to continue as financial integration declines. As a result of this, enormous recessions risk 
becoming the norm, with a return to prosperity permanently elusive as an example, Ireland’s GDP 
has collapsed to 10%, remaining static at that approximate percentage since external measures 
were introduced. Greece, for reasons which are seemingly obvious, has simply stopped publishing 
GPD figures in 2012 entirely, but it is reasonable to conclude that their GDP is significantly lower than 
other EU nations, given they are in a deep depression. Italy, which is more significantly tapped into 
the eurozone economy, was also collapsing along with Spain. Wage reductions and unemployment 
rates of approximately 25% compound the problem, with Greece having a youth unemployment 
rate of approximately 60%. It is anticipated that the unemployment rates in each of the affected 
eurozone nations under discussion will continue to rise over the coming years, with the eurozone 
economy also contracting. Indeed, as recently as February 2013, the contraction continues at 0.6%.
In sum, the eurozone is now in extreme debt and needing similar intervention. Political and eco-
nomic proponents of the eurozone were arguably unaware of these dangers of cross-border finan-
cial flows and current account imbalances because they were blinded, in part, by their ethos of ever 
closer union. They also thought these flows were the purpose of the exercise, seeing the aim as to 
get the capital to flow using any means possible. These nation states appear to consider that cur-
rency risk was the only danger to these capital flows, a risk they believed had been eliminated. The 
recent evidence strongly indicates they were unambiguously wrong. Regardless of this, however, we 
can present some potential solutions to the economic crisis in the eurozone, based on the evidence 
we have advanced thus far.
4. Analysis of solutions
It is not possible to review non-existent regional currency. With the euro dominating, measuring the 
strength of a regional national currency has become impossible. It is, however, possible to consider 
an existent regional public sector debt. This acts as an effective proxy for measuring national 
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prosperity in a given state. Wolf (2012a) has argued, currency risk becomes a credit risk in a national 
economy. This is where some nations within the eurozone have ended up. Granted, regions within 
sovereign countries can also suffer the consequences of current account imbalances, showing as 
localised recessions, however, the measures taken by national governments can either contain or 
exacerbate their effects.
Most developed countries have ways of transferring capital from the richer members of society 
and towards the poorest members in depressed regions. This functions effectively in Britain given it 
has a mature welfare state; however, some eurozone countries—certainly the less developed former 
Soviet countries—simply do not have such advanced mechanisms of social support. By improving on 
such sources, economic productivity may be stimulated through a Keynesian-style investment strat-
egy across the EU, targeting areas most in need of a kick start, triggering economic growth whilst 
safeguarding against the threat of future regional downturns.
It is also important to note the eurozone operates on a form of “gold standard fiscal transfer 
mechanism”. This was, stylistically, a nineteenth century arrangement for which countries had ir-
revocably fixed exchange rates and the adjustment mechanisms. This is essentially one of the major 
causal factors of the current recession, and so remedying it can act as a gateway to returning stabil-
ity and future prosperity. David Hume advanced a proposition of a price-specie flow mechanism in his 
work “The Theory of Money”. He argued:
It is the proportion between the circulating money, and the commodities in the market, 
which determines the prices. Goods, that are consumed at home, or exchanged with other 
goods in the neighbourhood, never come to market; they affect not in the least the current 
specie; with regard to it they are as if totally annihilated; and consequently this method of 
using them sinks the proportion on the side of the commodities, and increases the prices 
(sic). But after money enters into all contracts and sales, and is everywhere the measure 
of exchange, the same national cash has a much greater task to perform; all commodities 
are then in the market; the sphere of circulation is enlarged; it is the same case as if that 
individual sum were to serve a larger kingdom; and therefore, the proportion being here 
lessened on the side of the money, everything must become cheaper, and the prices 
gradually fall. (Hume, 1752, p. 43)
An economy with a positive balance of trade would be in receipt of more capital, whilst an economy 
with a negative balance of trade would see the inverse. Those economies with rising levels of trade 
would see increases to inflation and prices, whilst those with declining levels would see deflation 
and declining prices. Hume’s theory, of course assumes the absence of a central bank. In the modern 
EU, such a thing exists; however, this does not detract from the overall thesis and possible value in 
better understanding solutions to fixing the eurozone’s economic structure.
As stated earlier, most EU nations have a commitment to a broadly social democratic welfare 
system, the existence of which compels nations to believe they are more developed economically 
and, therefore, in no need of a structural adjustment programme. State welfare is, broadly speaking, 
an indicator of a prosperous society sufficient to invest in social enterprises. Inversely, structural 
adjustment programmes are mostly used to develop emerging economies that lack a mature econ-
omy and such social enterprises. Wolf argues the dependent nations in the eurozone “… have be-
come emerging economies” which is “… a crisis for them. Their banking sectors have essentially been 
destroyed, and in the case of Ireland massively so” (Wolf, 2012a, p. 12). Structural adjustment pro-
grammes enable neoliberal economics to dominate, such as demanding the retreat of the state in 
favour of the free market. Such programmes have, in some form, already been applied to Greece 
carrying with them that transformative ideology. It must be noted, however, that as Hay (2013) re-
minds us neo-liberalism is not the sole capitalist model.
So, succinctly, the starting point for economic union was a mistake. The ideology underpinning it, 
the economic philosophy and the incorporation of less developed countries into the project laid the 
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foundations for the crisis. This led to bankruptcies, private retrenchment, collapsing GPDs, soaring 
unemployment, exorbitant bond yields in deficit countries, tightening links between domestic banks 
and their governments and rising political friction as seen in Greece. Interventions by the European 
Central Bank have increased to try and stem the declines, but these are hardly enough to offset the 
blockage to the flow of capital. The institutions of global governance are acting as gatekeepers, and 
have taken the position that the net flow of credit should be forced into an external surplus to main-
tain the eurozone. As a result of these pressures, countries that did not have fiscal crisis before are 
starting to show those signs now.
The central question therefore must be how do you resolve a crisis of this magnitude? How is the 
eurozone crisis going to be resolved, and can it be done in a sustainable manner? The catastrophic 
outcome is the possible break-up of the eurozone. Despite being imprudently established, it is some-
thing which must be worked with. We cannot see any means by which its breakup would not tear the 
eurozone economy apart, with worse political consequences to follow. Fouskas and Dimoulas (2012, 
pp. 5–6) argue that “… a return to national currencies entails a step backwards to national self-reli-
ancy, thus spelling isolation and even authoritarianism and dictatorships à la the 1930s on this 
scenario, protectionism, authoritarianism and even war are just around the corner”. Simply, main-
taining the eurozone leviathan may be difficult, costly and expensive, but its splintering would be 
even more catastrophic. The reasons it has stayed together, and most likely will continue to stay 
together, is few can think of a way of breaking it up without causing such turmoil. We described this 
as the “bad marriage scenario”. You are in a bad marriage in which you cannot even imagine how to 
divide the property and the children, so it becomes impossible to countenance. This is not good for 
relations between the member states, and is disastrous in finding some way through it, so we ad-
vance the following as solutions and ways forward.
Firstly, there needs to be internal fiscal readjustments if a government is borrowing more than it 
can maintain. However, although rebalancing the economy is essential, the lack of a strong private 
sector makes austerity highly problematic: “I think fiscal austerity is too fast and it’s too one-sided—
particularly when the external sector, competitiveness, and the private sector is weak” (Wolf, 2012a, 
p. 13). The private sector simply cannot obtain the funds needed from domestic banks in order to 
finance its operations. Given this, mistimed austerity risks entrenching the economy, driving down 
wages and causing a depression. A return of competitiveness to prevent this is vital, with domestic 
markets having access to finance and continued state-investment to prevent that outcome (Wolf, 
2012a).
Secondly, financing new on-going spending in the short to medium term is important. In the im-
mediacy, this is to maintain the eurozone economies through the period of adjustments whilst 
avoiding a deeper depression. In this, the IMF would be instrumental in preventing the mass bank-
ruptcy of eurozone states. Strong emphasis must be placed on a state’s ability to maintain a working 
financial system and manageable costs of government expenditure. In terms of paying back the 
funds advanced to indebted states, there is “… no doubt that they have to write down the debt. 
Portugal also will have to, and that may be true of Ireland” (Wolf, 2012a, p. 13).
Finally there has to be real adjustments to the model of competitiveness. Structural reforms, diver-
gence deflation across the eurozone and stronger final demand in the core countries can help frame 
a recovery. “Comparative political economy as a field of study has long understood that, even within 
a globalised economy, different ‘models of capitalism’ can exist” (Hay, 2013, pp. 1–2). It is anticipated 
that new models of capitalism will take approximately a decade of state-led direction to emerge. Such 
may be built on a looser relationship between states, reflecting the differences in models of capital-
ism, but held together by a minimal federal and banking union within the eurozone. Political aspira-
tions to create a United States of Europe are unrealistic at this point because the neoliberal model of 
capitalism has failed fiscally (Hay, 2013); however, a looser form of federal union inspired by the US 80 
years ago may be more likely to keep the eurozone together, with the strong caveat that comparisons 
between the eurozone and the US are often asymmetrical vis-à-vis the eurozone is not a country 
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(Wolf, 2012b). Essentially, this would entail a banking union with responsibility for resolving the flaws 
in domestic banks and supporting such institutions through central direction rather than by individual 
states.
Such states are, at the moment, insolvent and do not have the capital to rescue declining banks. 
It would, for example, be problematic to compel Spain to bail out its banks when it lacks the solvency 
required to do so. The eurozone banking sector needs an adequate safety net so that countries can 
continue to function. The collective issuing of Euro-bonds is one way to do this, which would require 
an enhanced European stability mechanism which exceeds the existing 500,000 billion euros. Whilst 
some have postured the idea of a transfer union, we agree with the Germans that it is undesirable 
because a return to prosperity would be held back by turning the weaker countries of the union into 
permanently dependent regions.
Making these adjustments to the financial sector will be a significant undertaking, due to the com-
plexities of integrating 19 multi-sided national economies. Simply achieving federal or fiscal union 
may also not automatically lead to prosperity. Moreover, the ideological differences in economic 
perspectives remain very large, and regional competitiveness between state actors will retard the 
possibility of even closer union. Culturally, some may not identify with one another, bringing to the 
table different perspectives and economic needs.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The principal political force is the commitment to the ideal of an integrated Europe, along with the 
huge investment of the elite in that project. This enormously important motivation is often underes-
timated by outsiders. While the eurozone is not a country, it is much more than a currency union. For 
Germany, much the most important member, the eurozone is the capstone of a process of integra-
tion with its neighbours that has helped bring stability and prosperity after the disasters of the first 
half of the twentieth century. The choices facing the eurozone are bleak, the determination to keep 
it together should not be underestimated. The road ahead remains difficult because the economic 
crisis has not been a normal recession. Its trigger, the financial crisis, has made measuring recovery 
highly problematic. These are problems eurozone elite members are willing to navigate. Thus, the 
eurozone will continue as a miserable marriage, but one which can and most likely will endure. More 
broadly, some may take lessons from the strategies of the 1930s, yet the composition of the 
European economy is, of course, very different. However, as Fisher argues, the propensity towards 
disregarding catastrophes and an over-confidence in the prior economic model can, in part, be at-
tributed for both. As Hay (2013) argues, alternative models remain open to assist in the emergence 
of a new workable economic theory. Such new theories have recently been called for by Crines and 
McIntosh (2013), arguing “… a new economic model is likely to be needed to return the west to pros-
perity. When such emerges, our political leaders must be receptive to new ideas”. Such new ideas 
will also need to be communicated to the electorate in a manner likely to ensure a receptive audi-
ence. This presents the eurozone elites with an opportunity to go beyond the free market form of 
capitalism, and to consider new ideas for capitalist expansion. Such ideas are worthy of develop-
ment in further scholarship.
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